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Toward a Theory of Secure Networked Control Systems

The conceptual shift of sensor rich systems from passive information gathering viewpoint to a networked control viewpoint has resulted in new challenges in ensuring their secure and dependable operation. These challenges will require the development of resilient control techniques as well as introduction of novel security and trust principles. In this talk, we identify the unique requirements for securing networked-control systems and their differences from traditional IT security systems. We will discuss three key challenges for securing networked control systems: (1) Understanding of the threats and possible consequences of attacks, (2) Attack detection and recovery by using models of the physical system, and (3) System resilience under attacks. In order to illustrate the progress made in these areas, we will discuss two case studies: the Gignac canal water distribution system located in Southern France, and the Tennessee-Eastman process control system. For the Gignac canal water distribution system, we use the knowledge of approximate system dynamics and associated regulatory controller design to analyze the impact of deception attacks on the performance of the closed-loop system. We test the proposed attack scheme in simulation and show that the attack is indeed realizable in practice by implementing it on the physical canal system. We also discuss the theoretical limits of stabilizability and detectability of deception attacks for the shallow water model of water flow dynamics in canals. For the Tennessee-Eastman process control system, we discuss the use of statistical anomaly detection methods in detecting deception attacks and also present an analysis of stealthy attacks. Such attacks can be carried out by an adaptive adversary who tries to evade the anomaly detection scheme. We will end the talk by presenting our preliminary findings on security analysis of power system static-state estimators. (This is a joint work with Alexandre Bayen, Alvaro Cardenas, Xavier Litrico, and Shankar Sastry)
Type of Seminar:
IfA Internal Seminar
Saurabh Amin
UC Berkley
Jan 14, 2010   11:00

Contact Person:

Prof. J. Lygeros
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Biographical Sketch:
Saurabh is a Ph.D. candidate in the Civil and Environmental Engineering, Systems Engineering program at UC Berkeley. Before coming to Berkeley, he studied civil engineering at the Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee (formerly, University of Roorkee). He then studied transportation engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, where he obtained an M.S.E. in the area of infrastructure systems. After coming to Berkeley, he has been working in robust and secure control of physical infrastructure systems using techniques drawn from the theory of hybrid, stochastic and distributed parameter control systems. His research has been supervised by Professor S. Shankar Sastry and Professor Alexandre M. Bayen.