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Repeated Bimatrix Games


Stefan Frei, V. Srampical

Semester Thesis, FS12 (10189)

The Nash Equilibrium is the general solution concept for non-cooperative bimatrix games. We develop an algorithm that identi es all Nash Equilibria of non-degenerate bimatrix games. A special case of repeated bimatrix games is examined where both players keep an estimate of the opponent's payo matrix. Interesting properties of such games are stated and proven. Due to the estimated payo matrices, each player pursues a Nash Equilibrium strategy that deviates from the Nash Equilibrium of the "true" game where both players have perfect information. We explore whether players can take advantage of this fact and maximize their expected payo by applying di erent strategies. Three strategies are introduced and compared on a game inspired by car racing. It seems like a simplistic best response strategy performs the best.


Type of Publication:

(13)Semester/Bachelor Thesis

S. Summers

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% Autogenerated BibTeX entry
@PhdThesis { FreSra:2012:IFA_4238
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