Note: This content is accessible to all versions of every browser. However, this browser does not seem to support current Web standards, preventing the display of our site's design details.

  

Design of Fixed-Iteration Market Mechanisms

Author(s):

A. Hauswirth
Conference/Journal:

Semester Thesis, FS13 (10254)
Abstract:

Market mechanisms describe the process of matching supply and demand among market participants and the discovery of adequate prices. Electricity markets are particularly susceptible to the mechanisms employed due to the fact that they are coupled in time und subject to uncertainties. Existing market mechanisms such as double-sided auction do not allow for ecient price discovery and do not accommodate uncertainty well. We propose a new mechanism that addresses the rst of these two challenges and opens possibilities of solving the later. Based on the idea of Walrasian Tātonnement we suggest an iterative procedure that converges to the market equilibrium and gives guarantees about available reserve capacities at each iteration such that markets can potentially be cleared at any time.

Year:

2013
Type of Publication:

(13)Semester/Bachelor Thesis
Supervisor:

J. Warrington

No Files for download available.
% Autogenerated BibTeX entry
@PhdThesis { Xxx:2013:IFA_4523
}
Permanent link