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Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks: Models, Fundamental Limitations and Monitor Design


F. Pasqualetti, F. Dörfler, F. Bullo

IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Orlando, FL, USA, pp. 2195-2201

Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network components malfunction or measurements corruption caused by an omniscient adversary. We model a power system under cyberphysical attack as a linear time-invariant descriptor system with unknown inputs. Our attack model generalizes the prototypical stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. We characterize the fundamental limitations of both static and dynamic procedures for attack detection and identification. Additionally, we design provably-correct (dynamic) detection and identification procedures based on tools from geometric control theory. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our method through a comparison with existing (static) detection algorithms, and through a numerical study.


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% Autogenerated BibTeX entry
@InProceedings { PasD_r:2011:IFA_4916,
    author={F. Pasqualetti and F. D{\"o}rfler and F. Bullo},
    title={{Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks: Models,
	  Fundamental Limitations and Monitor Design}},
    booktitle={IEEE Conference on Decision and Control},
    address={Orlando, FL, USA},
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