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Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks: Models, Fundamental Limitations and Monitor Design


F. Pasqualetti, F. Dörfler, F. Bullo


Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical malfunctions and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network components malfunction or measurements corruption caused by an omniscient adversary. We model a power system under cyber-physical attack as a linear time-invariant descriptor system with unknown inputs. Our attack model generalizes the prototypical stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. We characterize the fundamental limitations of both static and dynamic procedures for attack detection and identification. Additionally, we design provably-correct (dynamic) detection and identification procedures based on tools from geometric control theory. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our method through a comparison with existing (static) detection algorithms, and through a numerical study.


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% Autogenerated BibTeX entry
@Misc { PasD_r:2011:IFA_4951,
    author={F. Pasqualetti and F. D{\"o}rfler and F. Bullo},
    title={{Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks: Models,
	  Fundamental Limitations and Monitor Design}},
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