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Network aggregative games: Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria

Author(s):

F. Parise, B. Gentile, S. Grammatico, J. Lygeros
Conference/Journal:

IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Abstract:

We consider quasi-aggregative games for large populations of heterogeneous agents, whose interaction is deter- mined by an underlying communication network. Specifically, each agent minimizes a quadratic cost function, which depends on its own strategy and on a convex combination of the strategies of its neighbors, and is subject to heterogeneous convex constraints. We suggest two distributed algorithms that can be implemented to steer the best responses of the rational agents to a Nash equilibrium configuration. The convergence of these schemes is guaranteed under different sufficient con- ditions, depending on the matrices defining the cost and on the communication network.

Year:

2015
Type of Publication:

(01)Article
Supervisor:



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% Autogenerated BibTeX entry
@InProceedings { ParEtal:2015:IFA_5223,
    author={F. Parise and B. Gentile and S. Grammatico and J. Lygeros},
    title={{Network aggregative games: Distributed convergence to Nash
	  equilibria}},
    booktitle={IEEE Conference on Decision and Control},
    pages={},
    year={2015},
    address={},
    month=dec,
    url={http://control.ee.ethz.ch/index.cgi?page=publications;action=details;id=5223}
}
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